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CASE COMMENTARY
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
UNDER THE DAVIS-BACON ACT:
CLOSING SOME LOOPHOLES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENTMcDaniel v. University of Chicago and
Coutu v. Universities Research Association, Inc.
Laurie E. Leader*
Kenneth A. Jenero**
The Davis-Bacon Act 1 is a relatively unknown piece of legislation. Although the Act is an old one by American labor law standards and is, in fact,
the first federal law enacted to regulate the wages of non-government
employees, 2 it has received little attention in the legal literature. By its
terms, the Act is misleadingly simple. It requires payment of prevailing
wages, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, to laborers and mechanics
engaged in the construction, alteration, and/or repair of public works of the
3
United States .
Despite the Act's obscurity and facial simplicity, it has a significant impact
on our nation's economy. The Act not only regulates employee wages of the
largest customer of the construction industry, 4 but its administration by
means of prevailing wage determinations has a widespread effect upon labor
negotiations throughout that industry.' The task encompassed by administration and enforcement of the Act is, therefore, an onerous one.
* Partner, Leader & Tinaglia, Chicago, Illinois. A.B., Washington University; J.D., Cleveland State University.
** Associate, Borovsky, Ehrlich & Kronenberg, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., J.D., DePaul University.
1. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a-276a-5 (1976).
2. Elisburg, Wage Protection Under the Davis-Bacon Act, 28 LAB. L.J. 323, 323 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Elisburg].
3. 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1976). In addition to the Davis-Bacon Act, approximately 60 statutes
require payment of prevailing wage rates to laborers and mechanics engaged in government
construction. Among those statutes are the following: National Housing Act, § 212, 12 U.S.C. §
1715c (1976); Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, § 108(b), 23 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1976); Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1970, § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 1500c-3 (1976); Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 10, 49 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976). For a comprehensive list of federal prevailing
wage statutes, see 29 C.F.R. § 1, app. A (1979).
4. The federal government is clearly the largest single customer of the construction industry, accounting for an estimated $30 billion in new construction during 1975. A.J. THIEBLOT,
JR., THE DAVIS-BACON ACT 207 (1975) [hereinafter cited as THIEBLOT].
5. In addition to spreading union wage rates to the non-union sector, the Davis-Bacon Act
disperses urban wage rates throughout non-urban areas. THIEBLOT, supra note 4, at 160. For a
more detailed discussion of the effects of the Davis-Bacon Act on industry, see the 1974 survey
results of contractors. Id. at 156-66. Thus, the Act generally standardizes construction wage
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Two recent Seventh Circuit cases have further expanded the Act's overall
impact and scope of application. In McDaniel v. University of Chicago, 6 and
Coutu v. Universities Research Association, Inc., 7 the Seventh Circuit recognized a private right of action in government laborers and mechanics to
enforce payment of prevailing wage rates guaranteed to them by the DavisBacon Act. Moreover, the Coutu court held that the absence of Davis-Bacon
Act stipulations requiring payment of prevailing wages in the construction
contract between the government and the prime contractor would not automatically free the contractual parties from any Davis-Bacon obligations,
and that laborers and mechanics could enforce such obligations if they performed Davis-Bacon work pursuant to the subject government contract. 8
This Commentary reviews the legislative and case history of the DavisBacon Act as it developed prior to the McDaniel and Coutu decisions. The
two decisions effected changes in the scope and application of the DavisBacon Act worthy of discussion.
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT

The Original Davis-Bacon Act
The Davis-Bacon Act, like most early federal labor laws, was preceded by
state statutes. 9 Following the earliest of these state laws, congressional
hearings on maintaining local labor standards in construction work were held
beginning in 1898. 10 In a House report accompanying a bill of March 4,
1927, which provided that wages to be paid by private contractors on federal
construction must comply with the local standards of wages and working
conditions, the Committee members noted "that the least that the Federal

scales at union rates. It further influences the market organization of construction labor through
the work classifications specified by the Secretary of Labor in the Davis-Bacon determinations.
Id.at 146-48.
Whether the Act also strengthens unionization has been the subject of dispute. It is submitted that, to the extent that administrative mechanisms are effective in standardizing wages at
union rates, the Davis-Bacon Act minimizes the preference of government contractors to hire
nonunion labor. Examination of those mechanisms reveals that, more often than not, the Act is
less than vigorously enforced. See notes 49-73 and accompanying text infra. The advent of
industrial unionism further diminished the statute's impact on unionization because jurisdictional disputes then emerged among the building trade unions and industrial unions concerning
questions of coverage under the Act. Price, A Review of the Application of the Davis-Bacon
Act, 14 LAB. L.J. 614, 618-19 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Price].
6. 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978).
7. 595 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980).
8. Id. at 398-400.
9. Kansas enacted the first prevailing wage law for state construction in 1898. Johnson,
Prevailing Wage Legislation in the States, 8 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 840 (1961). Today only the
following states are without such legislation: Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, North
Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia. THIEBLOT,
supra note 4, at 214-15. The Illinois prevailing wage law, first enacted in 1941, covers public
work except maintenance. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 39s-1 to -12 (1977).
10. Price, supra note 5, at 614.
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Government should do is maintain an equally satisfactory standard (comparable to that established by state legislation) for federal construction work in
No legislation resulted from those hearings until 1931.
that state.""
The real impetus for government regulation of wages for public and private employees in public construction was the economic and social conditions of the 1930's. 12 During the Depression, the national conscience was
aroused by the effect of widespread unemployment on the wages of workers.
While the competition for limited markets forced employers to cut labor
costs, 13 the scarcity of work created an oversupply of labor that resulted in
low wage rates. 14 The absence of job opportunities further increased public
reliance upon federal construction as a source of employment at a time when
the federal government was required to award its Contracts to the lowest
bidder.' 5 This requirement prevented representatives of federal contracting
agencies from dictating that successful bidders pay their employees wages
comparable to those paid for similar labor in private industry in the vicinity
of the government projects under construction. Some successful bidders took
advantage of the government contracting agencies' impotence by "selfishly
import[ing] labor from distant localities and .

.

. exploit[ing] this labor at

wages far below local wage rates." 16 Local workmen were affected by their
inability to compete with the migratory labor, and qualified local contractors
found it impossible to compete with outside contractors who based their
estimates for labor costs upon the low wages paid to imported laborers. 17
The Davis-Bacon Act was designed to curtail such unscrupulous practices
among government contractors during a decade in which public works were
on an upswing and economists and politicians were particularly wary of depressed labor markets. 18 The Act also was designed to prohibit wage differ-

11. H.R. REP. No. 2311, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1927). See Price, supra note 5, at 614-15.
12. See generally 74 CONG. REC. 6504-21 (1931). Besides the Davis-Bacon Act, two other
legislative measures were designed to arrest the depression: (1) the National Industrial Recovery
Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (terminated by Exec. Order No. 7252, as reprinted in 15 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1976)), which establishes codes of fair competition for both prices and wages; and (2) the
Walsh-Healy Act, 40 U.S.C. § 35-45 (1976), which sets forth labor standards for government
supply contracts. Shortly after enactment, the National Industrial Recovery Act was declared
unconstitutional in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). For a
general overview of these statutes, see Donahue, The Davis-Bacon Act and the Walsh-Healy
Public Contracts Act: A Comparison of Coverage and Minimum Wage Provisions, 29 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 488 (1964).
13. S. REP. No. 1445, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1931).
14. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 2453, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1931).
15. TuIEBLOT, supra note 4, at 7.
16. S. REP. No. 1445, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1931).
17. See Brozen, The Late that Boomeranged, 62 NATION'S Bus. 70 (1974).
18. Elisburg, supra note 2, at 323-24; Price, supra note 5, at 616. But see THIEBLOT, supra
note 4, at 8-10. The author questions whether the depression and the fear of itinerant contractors and laborers were, rather than the true reasons for enactment of the Davis-Bacon Act,
rationalizations to promote its passage. In support of this theory, Dr. Thieblot notes the following: (1) the philosophy of the bill preceded the depression itself and the massive government
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entials from becoming a major competitive advantage in bidding on government construction contracts, and it thereby insured that the economic power
of the government as an employer would not contribute to a further demoralization of local labor markets. 1i To accomplish these goals, the Act
required government contractors to pay their laborers and mechanics the
prevailing private industry wage rates. 20
The compulsory nature of the Act's prevailing wage rate provision was
emphasized throughout the 1931 congressional debates on the Davis-Bacon
bills. 21 In fact, that provision emerged as the most controversial aspect of
the Act because it was vehemently argued that the prevailing wage provision
infringed upon the inherent fireedom of contract between contractors and
laborers. 22
Because the Act mandated that under all covered contracts the contractor
pay the prevailing wage rate, the only variable was the exact rate to be paid.
Should a dispute arise concerning the applicable wage rate, the contracting
officer first would attempt to adjust the rate in accordance with the character
of the work performed and the locality in which it was performed. 23 To the
projects undertaken to stimulate the depressed economy by several years; (2) the Act was
likely a union-oriented measure, because it would significantly protect Unions from nonunion
wage competition in an era of increased unionism, despite constitutional prohibitions against
specification of union labor in federal construction contracts; (3) the fear of itinerant laborers and
contractors was overstated from a statistical standpoint and, most probably, was colored by racial
bigotry; and (4) the contention that the Act was prompted by the Depression and problems of
bootleg labor was refoted by the fact that Congress declined to adopt the bill as special legislation during the emergency of the Depression. Id.
19. 74 CONG. REC. 6510-11 (1931) (remarks of Rep. Bacon).
20. Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 411, § 1, 46 Stat. 1494 (current version at 40 U.S.C. § 276a
(1976)). The original Act provided, in pertinent part:
That every contract in excess of $5,000 in amount, to which the United States or
the District Court of Columbia is a party, which requires or involves the employment of laborers or mechanics in the construction, alteration, and/or repair of any
public buildings of the United States or the District of Columbia within the geographical limits of the States of the Union or the District of Columbia, shall contain
a provision to the effect that the rate of wage for all laborers and mechanics
employed by the contractor or any subcontractor on the public buildings covered by
the contract shall be not less than the prevailing rate of wages for work of a similar
nature in the city, town, village, or other civil division of the State in which the
public buildings are located, or in the District of Columbia if the buildings are
located there ....
Id. (emphasis added).
21. See generally 74 CONG. REC. 6504-21 (1931).
22. Id. at 6509 (remarks of Rep. Blanton).
23. Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 411, § 1, 46 Stat. 1494 (current version at 40 U.S.C. §§
276a-276a-5 (1976)) provides that:
[l]n case any dispute arises as to what are the prevailing rates of wages for work of a
similar nature applicable to the contract which cannot be adjusted by the contracting officer, the matter shall be referred to the Secretary of Labor for determination
and his decision thereon shall be conclusive on all parties to the contract . ...
This crisis orientation toward administration of the Act created a virtual vacuum of enforcement.
Further problems arose from the lack of definition of "prevailing wage" under the original Act.
The current method for computation of prevailing wage rates appears at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.17
(1979).
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extent that the contracting officer could not resolve the dispute, the matter

was referred to the Secretary of Labor for a conclusive determination.

24

The 1935 and 1964 Amendments to the
Davis-Bacon Act
The original Davis-Bacon Act had several serious shortcomings. The Act
not only failed to inform laborers of the rights it afforded them, but was
devoid of effective mechanisms for the administration and enforcement of

those rights.

25

The enforcement problem was compounded by the absence

of definitions of key terms within the statute. Because the Secretary of Labor

was without authority to prevent wage conflicts through a predetermination
of prevailing wage rates, government contractors had no power to prevent
wage disputes from arising. The Secretary was only authorized to determine
such rates following a conflict, and this often meant that a contractor would
be forced to pay wages at a higher rate than those upon which the initial bid

was based.26
Accordingly, in 1935 Congress amended the Davis-Bacon Act in an .attempt to correct many of the readily apparent deficiencies of the original
legislation. 27 The 1935 amendment strengthened the Act in five significant
aspects. First, the amount involved in a construction contract subject to the

Act was lowered from five thousand dollars to two thousand dollars, and the
lower amount is contained in the present version of the Act.

28

Second, the

prevailing wage provision was expanded to require the unconditional payment of wages at least once each week, without subsequent rebates or de-

ductions.

213

Such wage payments were mandated "regardless of any contrac-

tual relationship which may be alleged to exist between the contractor or

24. Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 411, § 1, 46 Stat. 1494 (current version at 40 U.S.C. §§
276a-276a-5 (1976)).
25. The Secretary of Labor was curtailed from effective administration of the original Act in
two significant respects: (1) his or her role emerged as one of conciliation rather than independent enforcement due to the Act's provision for postdetermination of prevailing wage rates; and
(2) even assuming the Secretary's desire to curtail Davis-Bacon violations, the Act was without
sanctions to impose against derelict government contractors. Id.
26. See 79 CoNG. REc. 12,073 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
27. Act of August 30, 1935, ch. 825, § 1, 49 Stat. 1011 (current version at 40 U.S.C. §
276a(a) (1976)).
28. Id. By decreasing the dollar threshold for application of the Act to $2,000, Congress
extended coverage to most federal construction while retaining a floor below which the relatively slight effect on wage stabilization would not warrant administration. The propriety of the
still-existing $2,00) floor, in light of skyrocketing construction costs since 1935, has been aptly
questioned by a number of federal procurement agencies. The Department of the Interior, the
General Services Administration, and the Department of Housing, among others, argue that
this is no longer the point below which administration would have a de minimus effect upon
wage stabilization and, accordingly, advocate raising the threshold amount at varying levels from
$10,0(w, to $100,000. THIEBLOT, supra note 4, at 78.
29. Act of August 30, 1935, ch. 825, § 1, 49 Stat. 1011-12 (current version at 40 U.S.C.
§ 276a(a) (1976)).
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subcontractor and such laborers and mechanics." 30 Third, the contractor
was required to post applicable wage scales at the worksite to inform laborers of the wage protections afforded to them by the Act. 31 Fourth, to enable government contractors more accurately to approximate labor costs before submitting construction bids, 32 the Secretary of Labor's role under the
1935 amendment was expanded to one of predetermination, rather than
postdetermination, of prevailing wage rates. Finally, aggrieved workers were
afforded the same right of action against the contractor and the sureties as
was previously available to persons furnishing labor and materials pursuant
to the government contract. 3
The other significant amendment was enacted in 1964 in response to the
changing pattern of wage payments. 14 By this time, wages were no longer
the sole significant component of a worker's income; fringe benefits had become a large portion of the compensation received by the worker .3
Yet,
under the Act, the labor force of a local community could continue to lose
government contracts to competitors who were able to underbid them by
denying their workers fringe benefits. 36 To close this loophole and encourage employers to provide these benefits, Congress enacted the 1964
amendment to the Davis-Bacon Act. Specifically, that amendment redefined
the term "wages" 3 7 as used in the Act to include fringe benefits voluntarily
assumed by the contractor on behalf of his or her employees. .3
30. Id. Prior to 1935, laborers could, and often did, release government contractors from
Davis-Bacon obligations by private agreement. Both the 1935 amendment and subsequent judicial decision rendered such practices violative of the Act. See United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Morley Constr. Co., 98 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1938).
31. Act of August 30, 1935, ch. 825, § I, 49 Stat. 1011-12 (current version at 40 U.S.C.
§ 276a(a) (1976)). A correlate purpose of the provision was to insure "definite uniformity of wage
rates to be paid all labor employed on the job." H.R. COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1962).
32. Act of August 30, 1935, ch. 825, § 1, 49 Stat. 1011-12 (current version at 40 U.S.C. §
276a(a) (1976)). See 79 CONG. REc. 12073 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Walsh). For a discussion of
the 1935 "predetermination provision" in the 1931 congressional debates, see 74 CONG. REC.
6519-20 (1931) (remarks of Rep. Prall).
33. Act of August 30, 1935, ch. 825, § 3, 49 Stat. 1012 (current version at 40 U.S.C. §
276a-1 (1976)). If the funds withheld by the Comptroller General tinder the terms of the contract prove to be insufficient to reimburse laborers and mechanics for the failure to pay the
prevailing wages, such laborers and mechanics are given the same right of action against the
contractor and the sureties as has been conferred upon persons furnishing labor and materials.
Id. Therefore, laborers and mechanics can sue for the amount, or the balance thereof, unpaid at
the time of initiation of the suit. See 40 U.S.C. § 270b (1976).
34. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-348, 78 Stat. 238-40 (current version at 40 U.S.C.
§ 276a(b) (1976)).
35, Price, supra note 5, at 621-22.
36, 110 CONG. REC. 1217 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Halpern).
37. Prior to 1964, the Act did not precisely define wages. Yet, because it specified that they
were to be paid unconditionally, the Labor Department did not include fringe benefits, which
are usually contingent in nature; in its computations of prevailing wages. Id. at 14769 (remark of
Sen. Bartlett).
38. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-349, 78 Stat. 238-40 (current version at 40 U.S.C.
§ 276a(b) (1976)). This amendment defined the terms "wages," "scale of wages," "wage rates,"
"minimum wages," and "prevailing wages" as used in the Davis-Bacon Act to include:
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AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE

DAVIS-BACON ACT

As previously stated, the administration and enforcement of the DavisBacon Act are onerous tasks. This fact is due, in large part, to the bifurcated
delegation of these duties articulated in Reorganization Plan No. 14 39 and
implemented by the Office of the Secretary of Labor under the Code of
Federal Regulations. 40
Pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1949,41 President Truman established Reorganization Plan No. 14 as a means to coordinate the administration of labor standards under the Davis-Bacon Act and several other statutes
regulating federal construction and public works. 42 Under the Plan, administration eflorts were delegated to the Secretary of Labor, while responsibility for actual enforcement of the Act resided with the federal contracting
agencies. 43 The purpose of the Plan was to not only centralize administration, but also to provide uniformity of enforcement from agency to agency. 44

(1) the basic hourly rate of pay; and
(2) the amount of(A) the rate of contribution irrevocably made by a contractor or subcontractor to
a trustee or to a third person pursuant to a fund, plan, or program; and
(B) the rate of costs to the contractor or subcontractor which may be reasonably
anticipated in providing benefits to laborers and mechanics pursuant to an enforceable commitment to carry out a financially responsible plan or program
which was communicated in writing to the laborers and mechanics affected, for
medical and hospital care, pensions on retirement or death, compensation for
injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity, or insurance to provide
any of the foregoing, for unemployment benefits, life insurance, disability and
sickness insurance, or accident insurance, for vacation and holiday pay, for defraying costs of apprenticeship or other similar programs, or for other bona fide
fringe benefits, but only where the contractor or subcontractor is not required
by other Federal, State, or local law to provide any of such benefits ....
Id.
39. Reorg. Plan No. 14 of 1950, reprinted in 64 Stat. 1267 (1950) and in [1950] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1435, 1435 [hereinafter cited as Reorg. Plan No. 14].
40. 29 C.F.R. §§ 5.0 -. 17 (1979).
41. Reorganization Act of 1949, 5 U.S.C. § 903 (1976), authorizes the President to prepare
and submit to Congress any reorganization plans he finds are necessary to promote more effective management of the executive branch and its agencies.
42. Reorg. Plan No. 14, supra note 39. The statutes covered by the Plan include those
specifically requiring payment of prevailing wage rates to laborers and mechanics engaged in
government construction, see note 3 supra, as well as The Contract Work Hours Standards Act,
40 U.S.C. §§ 327-333(f) (1976), and the Copeland Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276c (1976).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 5.1 (1979). At present, the administrative burden is delegated to the Office
of Government Contract Wage Standards in the Employment Standards Administration's Wage
and Hour Division. The Division advises contractors and contracting agencies on the application of existing policies, regulations, and interpretations under the Davis-Bacon Act, and recomlnends statutory and regulatory revisions to the Employment Standards Administration. Elisburg, supra note 2, at 326-27. A general enumeration of the responsibilities of the contracting
agencies under the Act is contained within 29 C.F.R. § 5.6 (1979).
44. President's Message to Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950,
[1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1435, 1435-36.
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Pursuant to the Plan, the Secretary of Labor promulgated regulations
under the Code of Federal Regulations to coordinate its administration and
enforcement of applicable labor standards provisions. 45 The regulations
originally governed twenty-nine specific acts 46 that conferred upon the Secretary of Labor responsibilities similar to those bestowed upon him or her by
Reorganization Plan No. 14. By 1978 the number of regulated acts had increased to fifty-eight. 47 Leading labor authorities, however, have criticized
the regulations for not providing the degree of uniformity and effectiveness
needed to enforce labor standards equitably. 48
How the Enforcement Mechanism Works
The advertised specifications for every contract subject to the Davis-Bacon
Act must include a wage determination by the Secretary of Labor. 49 As a
government project approaches the bidding stage, the federal contracting
agency responsible for the project makes an initial determination of whether
the Act covers the work to be performed under the subject contract. If the
contemplated work is deemed to be covered by the Act, the federal contracting agency through its contracting officer must secure appropriate prevailing
wage rates for the project.50 The applicable wage determination is then
incorporated into the contract, thereby becoming a contractual obligation of
the successful bidder. 51 It is the further responsibility of the federal agency
to ascertain whether the required stipulation to pay prevailing wage rates
has been inserted in a covered government contract. 52 Disputes concerning

45. 29 C.F.R. §§ 5.0 -. 17 (1979).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 5.1 (1964).
47. 29 C.F.R, § 5.1 (1979).
48. See generally Price, supra note 5; Wolk, Mr. Davis-Mr. Bacon-But Who Is The Enforcer?, 15 LAB. L.J. 323 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Wolk].
49. 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1976).
50. See TuIEBLOT, supra note 4, at 31.
51. There are two methods by which the contracting officer may secure appropriate wage
determinations. First, in geographical areas in which wage scales are well-settled and numerous
government contracts are awarded annually, the Secretary of Labor may publish area or general
wage determinations. 29 C.F.R. § 1.5(b) (1979). Such determinations appear in the Federal
Register on a weekly basis and provide the usual method for obtaining prevailing wage
schedules. Alternatively, if general determinations are unavailable for the contemplated work in
the locality in which the government project is situated, the contracting officer must request a
project determination from the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 1.5(a). Project determinations are
applicable only to the particular project under review and remain effective for a maximum of
120 calendar days from the date of issuance. Id. § 1.7(a)(1). By contrast, area or general determinations remain in effect until withdrawn or superceded, although they are required to be
updated through timely publication. Id. § 1.7(a)(2).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 5.5(a), 6(a)(1) (1979). Every government contract subject to the Davis-Bacon
Act must contain the following clause:
All mechanics and laborers employed or working upon the site of work . . . will be
paid unconditionally and not less then once a week . . . at wage rates not less than
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the propriety of particular wage determinations may be referred to the Secretary of Labor for authoritative ruling, with appellate jurisdiction conferred
in the Wage Appeals Board. 53 Such administrative rulings, however, are
not subject to judicial review. 54
To assure continual compliance with labor standards enunciated by the
Davis-Bacon Act, the federal agency is empowered to examine submitted
payrolls and ledgers of government contractors 55 and to conduct investigations of their employment practices. 56 Although the Secretary of Labor is
authorized to conduct independent investigations as deemed necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the Act, 57 the bulk of this administrative chore is
clearly borne by the contracting agency.
When it is found that any laborer or mechanic employed by a contractor
directly on the worksite covered by the Davis-Bacon Act has been paid less
than the determined prevailing wage, the government may terminate the
subject contract and proceed with the work at the expense of the violating
contractor. 58 In addition, upon recommendation of either the contracting
59
agency or the. Department of Labor, the Comptroller General may debar
for a period of three years a contractor who has disregarded its obligations to
employees or subcontractors. 60

those contained in the wage determination decision of the Secretary of Labor which
is attached hereto and made a part hereof ....
Id. § 5.5(a).
See also 41 C.F.R, §§ 1-16.901-19A, -18.703-1 (1979) (setting forth approved forms for DavisBacon stipulations to pay prevailing wage rates under contracts funded through the Department
of Energy).
53. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1.16, 5.12 (1979).
54. It is well-settled that the Davis-Bacon Act affords no litigable rights to bidders for government contracts and that wage determinations rendered by the Secretary of Labor are judicially nonreviewable. United States v. Binghamton Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1954);
Burnett Constr. Co. v. United States, 413 F.2d 563, 566 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Tennessee Roadbuilders Ass'n v. Marshall, 446 F. Supp. 399, 403 (M.D. Tenn. 1977); North Ga. Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. United States Dep't of Transp., 399 F. Supp. 58, 63 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
This administrative deference is largely based upon the expertise prerequisite to the making of a
prevailing wage determination in a particular locality. Associated Builders & Contractors of Tex.
Gulf Coast, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 451 F. Supp. 281, 283 (S.D. Tex. 1978). By
contrast, such deference has not been accorded to initial coverage determinations since the
Seventh Circuit's 1979 decision in Coutu v. Universities Research Ass'n, Inc., 595 F.2d at
400-02. See notes 130-32 and accompanying text infra.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 5.6(a)(2) (1979).
56. Id. § 5.6(a)(3).
57. Id. § 5.11.
58. 40 U.S.C. § 276a-1 (1976).
59. Debarment describes the exclusion from government contracting and subcontracting.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 361 (5th ed. 1979).
60. 40 U.S.C. 276a-2(a) (1976). See 29 C.F.R. § 5.6(b)(1) (1979). This section provides that
whenever any contractor or subcontractor is found to be in aggravated or willful violation of
labor standards provisions or statutes, other than the Davis-Bacon Act, such contractor or subcontractor shall be debarred for a period not to exceed three years. For a list of the statutes
subject to this provision, see 29 C.F.R. § 5.1 (1979).
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Statutory Protection to Covered
Laborers and Mechanics
While the foregoing illustrates the sanctions that may be imposed upon
government contractors who violate the Davis-Bacon Act, it does little to
demonstrate how laborers and mechanics employed by such contractors may
recover wages to which they are entitled under the Act. Essentially, the Act
provides for two avenues by which workmen can obtain unlawfully withheld
back wages.
The first avenue to recovery is contained within the statute itself. Failure
to pay prevailing wages under a covered government contract may result in
the withholding from the violating contractor of so much accrued payments
as is considered necessary by the contracting officer to reimburse workers for
the difference between prevailing wages required by the contract and the
wages actually received. 61 The Comptroller General is authorized to disburse such sums to laborers and mechanics with wage claims. 62 In the
event that the accrued payments withheld are insufficient to satisfy all wage
claims, and a Miller Act payment bond has been posted on a particular construction project, 63 laborers and mechanics may obtain additional monies
for wage claims by suit on the Miller Act bond. 64 This approach is thus a
corollary to the first stated remedy, because the withholding of accrued
payments is a condition precedent to the recovery of unpaid wages.
The second avenue of relief to covered workmen is contained within the
applicable regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. 65 Where violations of the Davis-Bacon Act are found to be unwilled, the federal contracting agency head may request that restitution be made to laborers and
mechanics for unpaid wages, or to plans, funds, or programs established on
61. 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1976).
62. Id. § 276a-2(a). It should be noted that these provisions confer upon the workmen no
right to dictate that the United States withhold accrued payments for their wages. Rather, these
provisions merely provide aggrieved laborers and mechanics with a remedy if such sums have
been withheld. Veader v. Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co., 79 F. Supp. 837, 839 (D.
Mass. 1948).
63. The Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1976), is the federal construction bond statute
that parallels the Davis-Bacon Act. It generally requires that prime contractors on federal construction projects exceeding $2,000 in costs furnish payment and performance bonds to the
satisfaction of the contracting officer "'for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the [contemplated] work." Id. § 270a. In contrast to the mandatory
character of the Davis-Bacon Act, however, the Miller Act may be waived for certain types of
construction projects. For an overview of enforcement mechanisms under the Miller Act, see
Wallick & Stafford, The Miller Act: Enforcement of the Payment Bond, 29 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 514 (1964).
64. 40 U.S.C. § 276a-2(b) (1976). The Miller Act provides that:
Every person who has furnished labor or material in the prosecution of the work
provided for in such contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished ...
and who has not been paid in full therefore [within a specified period] shall have
the right to sue on such payment bond ....
Id. § 270b(a) (1976).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 5.10(a) (1979).
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their behalf for any type of fringe benefit prescribed in the applicable wage
determination. 66
While the withholding of funds is not a prerequisite to restitutional recovery under the regulations, both statutory remedies by which an aggrieved
workman may obtain the mandated wage rates lie within the discretion of
the federal contracting agency. Unless the contracting agency exercises this
discretion, the workman is precluded from recovering unpaid wages under
the statute. The workman would have no right to demand that funds be
withheld or that a Miller Bond be obtained from the contractor. 67 Inherent
problems emerge from this enforcement scheme. The contracting agency,
concerned with minimizing its own costs on a federal construction project, is
not the most likely participant to safeguard the rights of covered laborers
and mechanics, because the requirement to pay prevailing wage rates increases those costs. Nevertheless, that agency is charged with the primary
responsibility for enforcement of the Act in terms of incorporating wage
stipulations into a covered contract, 61 investigating government contractors
to assure day-to-day compliance with the Act, 69 and protecting laborers and
mechanics by insuring their receipt of prevailing wage rates. 70 This apparent conflict of interest has been accurately depicted by one author as a situation in which "the 'home team' not only plays its own baseball game, but
umpires as well.

' 71

Consequently, more often than not, laborers and mechanics employed by
government contractors are left with no assurance that they will receive the
wage rates to which they are statutorily entitled. Pursuant to the statute and
applicable regulations, they are at the mercy of the adversely interested federal contracting agency to secure their wages. The fact that the Secretary of
Labor is to oversee the administration of the Davis-Bacon Act is of no import
because the Secretary is dependent upon the contracting agency to furnish
investigatory information with regard to compliance with the Act. 72
Accordingly, until 1975 aggrieved workmen could not independently enforce the rights purportedly guaranteed to them by the Act. In that year, in
the landmark case of McDaniel v. University' of Chicago (McDaniel J),73 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an implied private right of action
existed under the Act to allow those workmen to vindicate their wage claims
in court.

66. Id.

67. See notes 62-63 supra.
68. 29 C.F.R. § 5.6(a)(1) (1979).
69. ld. § 5.6(a)(2).

70. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a, 276a-2 (1976). See generally notes 61-66 and accompanying text
supra.

71. Wolk, supra note 48, at 326.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 5.6(b)(2) (1979).

73. 512 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 810 (1976), affd, 548
F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978).
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MCDANIEL V. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AND THE
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION IMPLIED
FROM THE DAVIS-BACON ACT

McDaniel v. University of Chicago 74 involved a dispute arising out of a
government contract for the design, construction, and operation of the Argonne National Laboratory located in DuPage County, Illinois. By its terms,

the contract contemplated the performance of construction work that exceeded $2,000 in costs. The defendant contractor and the contracting

agency 75 agreed, however, that such work would be performed by
employees of subcontractors, thereby contractually excluding the workmen
of the defendant contractor from Davis-Bacon Act coverage. 76 The plaintiff,
Louis McDaniel, Jr., a laborer who constructed experimental units at the

defendant's Argonne facility, filed a lawsuit on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated to recover unpaid prevailing wages. He contended that,
notwithstanding the contractual exclusion of defendant's employees from
Davis-Bacon coverage, he and others performed construction work pursuant
to the subject contract and were entitled to be paid at the predetermined
wage rates.
The two federal claims in McDaniel alleged violations of the Davis-Bacon
Act: the first theorized an action against the government contractor for unpaid minimum wages under the Davis-Bacon Act; the second complained of
a breach of the subject contract allegedly executed' in contravention of the
Act. The district court, holding that the Davis-Bacon Act did not confer a

right of action against the contractor under the circumstances of the case,
dismissed the complaint. 77 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a
private right of action could be implied from the Act. 78

74. Id.
75. The contracting agency in both the McDaniel and Coutu decisions was the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) and its successor agencies, the Energy Research and )evelopment
Administration and the current Department of Energy.
76. The government contracts in McDaniel and Coutu contained a clause providing that all
Davis-Bacon work would be performed by subcontractors and their employees, and not by
employees of the defendant-contractor. See notes 106 & 112 and accompanying text infra. The
insertion of such clauses in AEC contracts is commonplace. See Price, supra note 5, at 631. The
clauses have been attacked because of their sweeping language, and the Coutu decision tested
the legality of such clauses.
77. See 512 F.2d at 585 (where the court of appeals discussed the unpublished opinion of
the district court).
78. Id. at 586-88. The plaintiff alleged that jurisdiction for the implied private right of action
was predicated upon the commerce clause, and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976), which provides that
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress that regulates commerce. 512 F.2d at 587. The McDaniel court analogized the minimum
wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976), to those of the
Davis-Bacon Act and concluded that the commerce clause constituted a "significant constitutional basis underlying the Davis-Bacon Act's validity." 512 F.2d at 587 & n.4. The commerce
clause basis for the Fair Labor Standards Act was first pronounced in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 117-24 (1941).
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The facts of McDaniel allowed and even compelled that holding. In
McDaniel, the plaintiff workmen were prima facie covered by the Act because the case involved a government construction contract in excess of
$2,000. Nevertheless, the contracting agency not only failed to require the
payment of prevailing wages to them, but also neglected to safeguard the
express statutory remedies by which the plaintiff laborers could challenge
the underpayment of wages.79 Accrued payments were not withheld from
the contractor for the future satisfaction of wage claims, nor was a Miller Act
bond furnished by the contractor. 80 Characterizing the McDaniel facts as
illustrative of a situation in which the express statutory remedies for payment of prevailing wages "have proved ineffective," the court stated that an
implied private right of action was necessary to fulfill Congress' purpose to
insure payment of prevailing wages to covered laborers and mechanics. 81
Absent a recognition of a private right of action under the Act to check the
enforcement abuses by the contracting agency, the rights of the plaintiff
laborers and mechanics would go unprotected, and the Act would be emasculated by the very structure designed to effectuate its purposes.
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court neither affirmed nor reversed
the appellate decision, but merely vacated and remanded the case to the
Seventh Circuit with instructions that the decision be reconsidered in light
of two recent cases, 82 Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour83 and
Cort v. Ash. 84 In Barbour and Ash the Supreme Court refused to imply a
private right of action from the applicable federal statutes. 85 The Seventh
Circuit, however, affirmed its earlier decision and found an implied action
(McDaniel II),8" a position to which the Supreme Court subsequently deferred. 87
Ironically, the McDaniel II court employed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Ash to support its finding of an implied private right of action under
the Davis-Bacon Act. The court specifically analyzed the McDaniel facts in
the context of the four factors pronounced in Ash as relevant in determining

79. See notes 61-64 and accompanying text supra.
80. 512 F.2d at 585. Furthermore, the court noted that the Miller Act itself does not provide a federal cause of action for failure to furnish a bond. Id. at n. 1 (citing Harry T. Ortlip Co.
v. Alvey Ferguson Co., 223 F. Supp. 893, 894 (E.D. Pa. 1963)).
81. Id. at 587.
82. University of Chicago v. McDaniel, 423 U.S. 810 (1976).
83. 421 U.S. 412 (1975). In Barbour, customers of failing broker-dealers attempted to compel the Securities Investor Protection Corporation to exercise its statutory authority for their
benefit. Id. at 414-15. The Supreme Court, however, denied implication of a private right of
action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 8aaa-78111 (1976). 421
U.S. at 418-25.
84. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Ash, the Supreme Court denied implication of a private right of
action under a criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976), to complainant citizens or stockholders
who sought to enjoin alleged violations of that statute. Id. at 82-84.
85. See notes 83-84 supra.
86. 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977).
87. 434 U.S. 1033 (1978) (denying certiorari).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:793

whether a private right of action is implicit in a federal statute. Those factors
are: (1) whether the statute creates a federal right in favor of the plaintiff; (2)
whether the applicable legislative history evidences an intention, either express or implied, to create or deny the proposed remedy; (3) whether the
implied remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of the statutory
scheme; and (4) whether the proposed cause of action is one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that
it would be inappropriate to infer a statutory cause of action predicated solely
upon federal law. s8 The McDaniel II court applied this four-step analysis
to conclude that there was a private right of action under the Davis-Bacon
Act.

The court had little difficulty in finding that the Davis-Bacon Act created a
federal right in favor of aggrieved laborers and mechanics. It found a basis
for this right on the face of the statute itself, which emphasizes that the Act
was designed to insure the payment of prevailing wages to laborers and
mechanics. 89 Consequently, these workmen were found to be the principal
beneficiaries of the statute as well as the third-party beneficiaries of the contract that statutorily mandates the payment of those wages to them. 9
The court resolved the question of whether Congress intended to grant or
deny a private right of action by examining the legislative history of the
Davis-Bacon Act and its companion statutes-the Miller Act 9 ' and the
Portal-to-Portal Pay Act. 92 Construction of the l)avis-Bacon Act in light of
these statutes revealed a congressional recognition of the laborers' right of
action. 93 The court also held that the implied private right of action was

88. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
89. 548 F.2d at 693. The court also found that the legislative history of the Davis-Bacon Act,
as well as subsequent congressional comment on the Act, indicated that the fundamental purpose of the Act was to guarantee payment of prevailing wages to laborers and mechanics.
90. 1d. The court emphasized, however, that workmen are not the exclusive beneficiaries of
the Act. "[The fact] that local contractors and communities may benefit from the Act does not
mean that it was not primarily directed toward the laborers and mechanics." Id.
91. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1976). See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra.
92. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1976). The Portal-to-Portal Pay Act immunized employers against
a proliferation of windfall wage and overtime claims that threatened "the solvency of numerous
employers and the stability of the industrial structure generally." Northwestern-Hanna Fuel Co.
v. McConb, 166 F.2d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 1948). These wage claims resulted from Supreme
Court decisions concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under this Act, employers were
immunized against employees' overtime wage claims unless such claims were based on an express contract provision, a collective bargaining agreement, or a custom of the employer. See
Note, Constitutionalityof the Portal-to-PortalAct, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 1010, 1012 (1947).
93. 548 F.2d at 694. The court found an intention to create an implied private right of
action by comparing the limitations periods contained in the Miller Act and the Portal-to-Portal
Pay Act. The latter Act encompassed a limitations period of two years applicable to actions
brought tinder the Davis-Bacon Act, whereas the limitations period tnder the former Act was
one year. The court interpreted this distinction as congressional recognition "that laborers are
able to sue at least as third party beneficiaries of the contract required by [the Davis-Bacon Act]
in state court or in federal court if there were proper jurisdiction." Id.
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consistent with the underlying purposes of the Davis-Bacon Act. Though the
Act itself contemplated some private remedies, 94 the court found that these
remedies were ineffective in accomplishing the congressional purpose.
Therefore, an implied private right of action was deemed necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act. 95
Finally, the fact that the nature of the implied action is contractual and,
thus, one traditionally relegated to state law, did not impede the McDaniel
II court's determination that aggrieved laborers and mechanics should be
afforded a federal remedy. Because Congress had expressed a federal policy
to pay covered workmen prevailing wage rates, a corresponding federal remedy was required to insure uniform and consistent enforcement of that policy. 96 Thus, based upon Barbour and Ash, the McDaniel II court again
guaranteed to aggrieved laborers and mechanics the right to proceed in federal court to obtain prevailing wages guaranteed to them by the Davis-Bacon
Act.
It is important to note, however, what the McDaniel court did not do.
The court did not directly address the contracting agency's failure to incorporate the required Davis-Bacon stipulation to pay prevailing wages in the
government contract. The legal consequence of an agreement between the
defendant contractor and the contracting agency to exclude their employees
from Davis-Bacon coverage remained to be determined by the Seventh Circuit in the companion case of Coutu v. Universities Research Association,
Inc. 97
COUTU V. UNIVERSITIES RESEARCH ASSOCIATION

AND THE

REQUIREMENT TO STIPULATE TO THE INCLUSION OF PREVAILING
WAGE RATES IN A GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

Coutu v. Universities Research Association, Inc. 98 found its origins in the
McDaniel I decision, which first recognized an implied private right of action
under the Davis-Bacon Act. Strikingly similar on their facts, both cases involved government contracts for the design, construction, and operation of
nuclear accelerator laboratories, and a failure by the contracting agency to
perceive the Davis-Bacon implications of those contracts. Consequently, in
both cases, the required statutory stipulation to pay prevailing wage rates
was absent from the subject contract.

94. Laborers and mechanics are given a right of action against the contractor and its sureties
if accrued payments withheld under the contract are insufficient to reimburse them for wages to
which they are entitled. 40 U.S.C. § 276a-2(b) (1976). Laborers are also given a priivate right of
action to sue on a Miller bond. 40 U.S.C. § 270b (1976). See notes 63-64 and accompanying text
supra.
95. 548 F.2d at 694.
96. Id. at 695.
97. 595 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S.Ct. 1310 (1980).
98. Id.
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It was not surprising that the defendant in Coutu argued for dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the absence of a wage rate stipulation
rendered the contract outside the scope of the Davis-Bacon Act. 99 The district court, however, dismissed only Count I of the complaint, which
improperly relied upon the existence of a stipulation to support breach of
contract allegations. 100 In so ruling, the district court implicitly accepted
the proposition that other contractual clauses could reveal that the agreement was one for Davis-Bacon work and was, therefore, subject to the
Act. 101

Following the dismissal of Count I, the Coutu case was transferred within
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 102 The defendant
then filed a motion for summary judgment, again contending that because
the contract did not contain a prevailing wage stipulation, it could not be
covered by the Act. In contrast to the initial district court decision dismissing Count I of the complaint, the subsequent district court decision characterized the mandatory stipulation as prerequisite to Davis-Bacon Act coverage. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted for the defendant. This
created, to say the least, confusion as to the legal effect of a failure to include the required wage rate stipulation in a government construction contract.
The Seventh Circuit accepted, to a limited extent, the latter reasoning: if
the contract was not within the scope of the Davis-Bacon Act, plaintiffs were
not entitled to recover. 103 The appellate court, however, refused to analyze
the coverage issue solely on the basis of whether the contract contained an
explicit prevailing wage stipulation. Instead, it posited that there may be
other evidence that the contract is one for Davis-Bacon Act work, in which
case, the required stipulation would be incorporated into the contract by
operation of law. 104 Concluding that the mandatory stipulation had been so
incorporated into the subject contract, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment. 105

99. 595 F.2d at 398. Although McDaniel also involved a contract without a stipulation to pay

prevailing wage rates, the defense of absence of such stipulation was not raised in the pre-Coutu
stages of the McDaniel litigation. Nevertheless, the Coutu defendant used the absence of the
wage rate stipulation as the basis for its defense against alleged Davis-Bacon violations. Following the Coutu district court's favorable response to this argument the McDaniel defendants
raised this issue in a motion for summary judgment, The motion ultimately was denied because

the Coutu appellate decision, reversing the district court's decision, was published before the
McDaniel court could render a favorable decision on this issue.
100. Id. at 397.
101. See id. at 398. Here the Seventh Circuit analyzed the unreported memorandum of the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (McGarr, J.). This analysis was the basis for

the court's holding that, despite the absence of a standard prevailing wage provision, the Coutu
contract was subject to the Davis-Bacon Act. Id. at 400.
102. Id. at 397.
103. Id. at 398.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 402.

1980]

DAVIS-BACON ACT

Specifically, the court focused upon two sources to find "other evidence"
that the contract was one for Davis-Bacon Act work. First, it looked to the
specific clause in the government contract that the defendant had contended
expressly excluded its employees from coverage under the Act. That clause
provided that the contract did not contemplate that employees of the Association would do work subject to the Davis-Bacon Act. 106 The contract
further provided that any statutorily covered work would be performed by
subcontractors. 107 Second, the court relied upon the contracting agency's
letter to the president of the defendant stating that the quoted exclusionary
clause had been incorporated into the contract with the understanding that if
conditions arose which made it necessary for employees of the defendant to
perform covered work, the contract would be modified to include the Act's
labor and wage provisions. 108
While the foregoing evidence did not answer the ultimate question of who
was actually performing Davis-Bacon Act work at the project site, the court
found it sufficient to demonstrate that such work was contemplated by and
might even be required under the subject contract. 109 If, as alleged in the
complaint, the defendant's own employees performed construction, alteration, and/or repair work within the meaning of the Act, they would be entitled to the prevailing wages for similar work in the locality in which that
work was performed. 110 To the extent that those employees 'were covered
by the Act, the defendant had placed itself in the position of a subcontractor
with the attendant obligations set forth in the exclusionary clause of the government contract. The court deemed superfluous the expressed administra106. The contract provided:
This contract does not contemplate the performance of work by the Association,
with its own employees, which the Commission determines is subject to the
Davis-Bacon Act. Such work, if any, performed under this contract shall be procured by subcontracts which shall be subject to the written approval of the Commission and shall contain the provisions relative to labor and wages required by law
to be included in contracts for the construction, alteration, and/or repair, including
painting and decorating, of a public building or public work.
Id. at 398, quoting article XXXIII of the contract.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 399. See Brief for Appellant at 12, Coutu v. Universities Research Association,
Inc., 595 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1979). The letter stated in pertinent part:
This provision with respect to the Davis-Bacon Act has been discussed between
representatives of the AEC and the Association, and has been included with the
following understanding:
(a) If presently unforeseen conditions arise which make it necessary in the best
interests of timely and efficient completion of the accelerator that work be performed by the Association with its own employees which AEC determines is subject to the Davis-Bacon Act, the contract will be modified as appropriate to incorporate the provisions relative to labor and wages required by law.
Id. at 12. See also 41 C.F.R. § 9-18.701-52(b)(1) (1979) (requiring modification of a government
contract not originally contemplating Davis-Bacon work if such work is actually performed at the
project site).
109. 595 F.2d at 398-99.
110. Id. at 399.
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tive intention to modify the contract if Davis-Bacon Act work was performed

by the defendant's employees. No such amendment was required because
"inder McDaniel I the contract was already so modified by operation of
law ..... 111
This reading of the court's prior McDaniel decision probably came as a
surprise to the defendant, which had consistently argued that the private right
of action afforded to the McDaniel plaintiffs was predicated upon a contractual commitment to pay prevailing wage rates. The McDaniel and Coutu
tandem, however, was not distinguishable on that basis. The court correctly

noted that despite the absence of Davis-Bacon stipulations and the existence
of an exclusionary clause virtually identical to the one in the McDaniel contract,

112

the contract at issue in Coutu was subject to the provisions of the

Act. M1

Indeed, a contrary holding in Coutu would have emasculated the Act's
guarantee of prevailing wages. The workmen's independent statutory right
had been implied from the purpose and intent of the Act, rather than from
the contract between the government and the contractor. It would be
anomalous to allow the contractor to shield itself from liability simply by

disregarding the clear mandate of the Act and failing to include the required
wage stipulations in its contracts. If the workmen's right could be so easily

defeated, it would not be difficult to envision every contractor doing DavisBacon work seeking to avoid inclusion of the stipulations. Nor, as previously

stated, would it be unusual for the contracting agency to permit such avoidance of statutory requirements. 114
In reading the mandatory wage stipulation into the government contract,

the Coutu court asserted that it was "following precedents established as

early as 1827 and applied consistently thereafter."

115

The mandatory

111. Id.
112. Compare the Coutu exclusionary clause, note 106 supra, with the following clause in the
McDaniel contract between the defendant University of Chicago and the contracting agency:
26.5 Davis-Bacon and Other Labor Provisionsfor Construction Subcontractors
The University and the Commission have agreed upon a procedure under which the
Commission will determine when work to be undertaken at the Laboratory facilities
is covered by the Davis-Bacon Act. When it is determined that the Davis-Bacon Act
does cover a particular work project, the University shall procure by subcontract
the covered work. Any subcontract entered into under this section shall contain the
provisions relative to labor and wages required by law to be included in contracts
for the construction, alteration and/or repair, including painting and decorating, of a
public building or public work. When requested by the Commission, any such subcontract shall be submitted for Commission approval.
595 F.2d at 399 n.7.
113. See 595 F.2d at 399, quoting the first McDaniel decision, 512 F.2d at 584, as follows:
"There is no question but that this government contract was subject to the Davis-Bacon Act." It
should be noted, however, that while the McDaniel I court summarily concluded that the government contract was within the scope of the Act, the basis for that conclusion was never
enunciated.
114. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
115. 595 F.2d at 400. The precedents to which the court referred are generally embodied
within the "Christian Doctrine." G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct.
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character 116 and protective purpose 117 of the Davis-Bacon Act further mandated the conclusion that the Act was not merely addressed to the legal form
Cl.), motion for reh. and reargumnent denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 954
(1963), reh. denied, 376 U.S. 929 (1964). Simply stated, the doctrine provides that when a
contractclause is required by statute or procurement regulation to be included in a government
contract, that clause is deemed incorporated as a matter of law into the contract. See generally
C. DEES & G. GINSBERG, CONTRACT INTERPRETATIONS AND DEFECTIVE SPECIFICATIONS 1-4
(1975). The following cases illustrate varied applications of this principle: Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. N.O. Nelson Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 352 (1934) (a bond contract is subject to the
statutes in force at the date of the contract even if these are not included in the written document); Antoni v. Greenlow, 107 U.S. 769 (1883) (laws applicable and in force at the time a bond
was purchased enter into and form a part of the bond contract itself); Von Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 71 U.S. 535 (1867) (power of taxation given to a municipality is a contract that cannot
be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212 (1827)
(the municipal law of the state, whether written or unwritten, forms a part of every contract
unless the parties agree otherwise); United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d
459 (5th Cir. .1977) (where applicable regulations require inclusion of a clause in every contract,
it is incorporated even if not agreed to by the parties); Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v.
American Tobacco Co., 31 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1929) (a lawful statute in force at the time an
import trade contract was made in France becomes part of the contract); City of Tullahoma v.
Coffee County, 204 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (a statute-Tennessee Valley Authority
Act-that relates to the subject matter of a contract and exists at the time of execution, becomes a part of such contract).
It should be noted, however, that prior to the McDaniel and Coutu decisions, there was some
support for the proposition that the conditions imposed by the Davis-Bacon Act were effective
only when, as expressly directed, they were included in the advertised specifications. The
Comptroller General stated:
Nor ...can we see how an omission of minimum wage representations and stipulations, even assuming that they should have been included, could be cured retroactively. . . .Where the conditions have not been included, whether properly or improperly, it is clear that the act does not of itself become binding upon a contractor. . . .While we might agree that the public policy manifest in the provisions of
the Davis-Bacon Act warrants cancellation and readvertisment, if feasible, of work
awarded without clearly applicable conditions, no corrective action would appear
possible where, due to substantial completion of the work or other practical considerations, it is not reasonable to cancel and readvertise.
40 COMP. GEN. 565, 570-71 (1961).
116. See 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1976). The Davis-Bacon Act requirement that every contract
involving construction in excess of $2,000 on government projects shall contain the required
minimum wage stipulation cannot be construed as anything but mandatory. See Association of
Am. R.R. v. Castle, 562 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Castle, the court stated: "The word
'shall' is the language of command in a statute, and there is no doubt that the Congress has
commanded [what the statute requires]." Id. at 1312. See also 75 CONG. REC. 6504-21 (1931)
(discussion of the compulsory nature of the Act's prevailing wage provision).
The regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 276c (1976) complement the requirement of the Act by dictating a like incorporation of applicable regulations,
including those dealing with the standard contract clauses that stipulate compliance with the
Act's minimum wage obligations. See id. § 276; 29 C.F.R. § 3.11 (1979).
117. In its two McDaniel decisions, the Seventh Circuit traced the history of the Davis-Bacon
Act and emphasized the highly remedial purpose of the Act. See, e.g., 512 F.2d at 587. Prior to
the McDaniel decisions, both the Supreme Court and Congress had pronounced clearly that the
statute was enacted for the benefit of construction workers. See United States v. Binghampton
Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 176-78 (1954); S. REP. No. 963, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1963).
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of a construction contract, but rather to the substantive right of workmen to
receive prevailing wages pursuant to that contract. Thus, the court concluded, the defendant contractor was compelled by law to pay the predetermined wage rates to covered workmen, regardless of the absence in the
subject contract of an express provision to do so.
The Coutu court, however, did not go so far as to reject contract content
as the test for determining applicability of the Davis-Bacon Act. The court
indicated that other evidence may be necessary to show that the contract
was one for covered work. 118 Nevertheless, because the contract clause and
contemporaneous letter purported to renounce the application of the Act to
work performed by the defendant's employees, it would appear that only a
mini'mal threshold showing of "other evidence" is required. Stated another
way, the court broadly construed the scope of the Davis-Bacon Act. If it
could be demonstrated that a government contract was one for construction,
alteration, and/or repair work and in excess of $2,000 in costs, the contract
would be deemed subject to the Act. Laborers and mechanics would then be
permitted to prove that the work they performed under it was in-fact
Davis-Bacon Act work. In essence, the character of the laborer's work would
be determinative of statutory coverage and the corresponding obligation of
the contractor to pay prevailing wage rates. 119
The Coutu court's corollary holding-that there is no requirement of
exhaustion of' administrative remedies conditioning the rights of workmen to
seek judicial relief under the Act-further buttressed the McDaniel decisions. More specifically, the McDaniel plaintiffs were allowed to proceed
judicially without a showing of either final or futile efforts to secure administrative relief. The McDaniel court implicitly had decided that aggrieved
laborers need not first seek redress from the contractor or contracting

118. 595 F.2d at 398.
119. Determining applicability of the l)avis-Bacon Act by means of the character of' actual
work performed at the project site, rather than by the contracting agency's classification of
contemplated work, is implicitly accepted within the Department of Energy regulations that set
forth criteria for statutory application to projects involving operational and maintenance activities. The pertinentregulation provides:
The classification of a contract as a contract for operational or maintenance activities
does not necessarily mean that all work and activities at the contract location are
classifiable as outside of Davis-Bacon coverage, since it may be necessary to separate out work which should be classified as covered. Therefore, heads of procuring
activities shall establish and maintain controls for the careful scrutiny of proposed
work assignments under such a contract to assure that:
(1) Contractors whose contracts do not contemplate the performance of covered
work with the contractor's own forces are neither asked nor authorized to perform
work within the scope of the Davis-Bacon Act. If the actual work assignments do
involve covered work, the contract should be modified to include applicable provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act.
41 C.F.R. § 9-18.701-52(b)(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
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agency. The Coutu court merely reiterated that decision in express language. 120
THE IMPACT OF THE McDANIEL AND COUTU
DECISIONS UPON FUTURE DAVIS-BACON LITIGATION AND THE
PROPRIETY OF THE COURTS' DECIDING THE "COVERAGE QUESTION"

Do the McDaniel and Coutu decisions compel a plaintiff to exhaust his or
her administrative remedies if such remedies are, in fact, available? In a
1948 case in which the Comptroller General withheld from a contractor
sums deemed necessary to pay employees the prevailing wage, the court
held that the aggrieved laborers could not bring an action against the United
States for the amounts withheld unless they could assert, as a condition
precedent, a demand upon the Comptroller General and a refusal to pay. 121
The court stated that "as a minimum preliminary condition to resort to the
courts, the claimant must assert his compliance with the terms prescribed by
Congress, else the courts cannot assume to take jurisdiction."122
More recently, in United States v. Capelletti Brothers, Inc., 123 plaintiff,
relying on the McDaniel decisions, brought an action against a government
contractor to recover sums allegedly due under the prevailing wage provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act. The court limited McDaniel to its specific
facts and held that plaintiff did not have a cause of action under the
Act. 124 The McDaniel court, it was stated, "specifically focused on cases
where the express remedies provided by the Act were ineffective or nonexistent, holding that in such cases, the Court should provide an alternative
remedy, if possible.' 125 In contrast to McDaniel, a Miller Act bond had
been posted by the contractor in Capelletti, and the Secretary of Labor was
investigating alleged statutory violations and the possibility of withholding
accrued payments from the contractor to reimburse complaining laborers and
mechanics. Under such circumstances, the court found that the plaintiff laborer was adequately protected by the express statutory remedies and, accordingly, deemed the implication of a private right of action unnecessary. 126 The court further held that the complaint was fatally deficient to
120. 595 F.2d at 400-01. The court emphasized that while the express statutory remedies and
corresponding regulations "presumably facilitate contractor compliance,

they do not assure a

remedy to employees." Id. at 401. Nowhere do the regulations authorize the Secretary of Labor
to order a contractor to pay more for Davis-Bacon work already completed. Thus, deference to
administrative regulations and the coverage determination of the contracting agency would be
inappropriate if, as plaintiffs alleged, Davis-Bacon work was actually performed by employees of
the Coutu defendant.
121. Veader v. Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co., 79 F. Supp. 837, 840 (D. Mass.
1948). Accord, Harris v. Owen, 180 Tenn. 492, 176 S.W.2d 812 (1944); A.W. Kutsche & Co. v.
Keith, 169 Tenn. 399, 88 S.W.2d 454 (1935); A.W. Kutsche & Co. v. Anderson, 169 Tenn. 98,
83 S.W.2d 243 (1935); Steward v. A.W. Kutsche & Co., 168 Tenn. 133, 76 S.W.2d 315 (1934).
122. 79 F. Supp. at 839-40.
123. 448 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Fla. 1978). See note 137 infra.
124. Id. at 68.

125. Id.
126. Id.
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sustain a private right of action because the plaintiff had failed to allege
"either that no payments were or would be withheld by the government,
or
alternatively, that any such monies withheld would be inadequate to reim1 27
burse the laborers."'
It should be noted that Capelletti pre-dates Coutu. Its holding, therefore,
is limited -in precedential value by the Coutu court's emphatic rejection of an
exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement under the Davis-Bacon
Act. The procedural thrust of the Capelletti decision is also suspect, because
neither the McDaniel nor Coutu plaintiffs were required to plead compliance
with or absence of effective administrative avenues in order to obtain access
to the judicial forum. Ironically, however, the Coutu decision offers some
support for the Capelletti "alternative remedy" rationale:
If defendant or our own research had uncovered administrative regulations
affording plaintiff and his class relief in this situation, we might require
recourse to that remedy before permitting this lawsuit to proceed. The
Davis-Bacon Act itself does not contain a provision requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this kind of case. 128
Furthermore, because the driving force behind McDaniel and Coutu was the
desire to make effective the congressional purpose of insuring the payment
of prevailing wages to laborers and mechanics on all government contracts, it
would seem reasonable for a court to exercise restraint and limit aggrieved
laborers to their administrative remedies where such remedies adequately
fulfill the Act's purpose. This is particularly true in light of the judiciary's
desire to avoid unnecessary invasions into the jurisdictional sphere of the
executive branch of government.
In any event, such a narrow reading of the McDaniel and Coutu tandem
would in no way detract from their significance. By closing a loophole in the
overall enforcement scheme under the Davis-Bacon Act, the decisions
should have a prophylactic effect upon attempts by either the contractor or
the contracting governmental agency to subvert the clear mandate of the
Act. These decisions will have the further effect of insuring that the circuitous nature of the administration and enforcement of the Davis-Bacon Act,
with its attendant lack of checks and balances, will not work to the detriment
of the very laborers and mechanics whom the Act is designed to protect.
The McDaniel and Coutu decisions, in their judicial determination of
coverage questions under the Davis-Bacon Act, infringed upon areas traditionally relegated to administrative law. A final question thus emerges as to
the propriety of judicial determination of whether a government contract is
covered by the Act. The Coutu defendant had argued against judicial review

127. Id. See Ybanez v. Anchor Constructors, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
128. 595 F.2d at 400. See also Coutu v. Universities Research Ass'n, Inc., No. 75 C 1129

(N.D. I11.Oct. 8, 1975). There, Judge McGarr stated that "[t]he Court need not determine
whether exhaustion of these remedies is a condition precedent to a cause of action on defendant's contractual commitments unless it be shown that such remedies do, in fact, exist." Id.
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of the contracting agency's determination of "noncoverage" and the corresponding lack of Davis-Bacon stipulations in the subject contract. Citing considerable authority for the proposition that prevailing wage determinations
were nonreviewable, the defendant maintained that analogously coverage determinations were outside the scope of judicial decision. 129

Although not directly addressing the proposed analogy, the Coutu court
implicitly distinguished between wage determinations and coverage determinations. 130

This distinction appears warranted upon examination of the

nature of the questions and the expertise required for such determinations.
Prevailing wage determinations involve the compilation and analysis of often
complex wage data and the mathematical computation of wage rates. 131
Clearly such work is more appropriately within the province and expertise of
the executive branch of government. By contrast, coverage determinations
require construction of the underlying statute and practical application of
that statute, tasks falling within the expertise and constitutional jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 132
For purposes of the analysis of coverage questions, the legislative intent

behind the Act emerges as all-important. Because the bureaucratic entanglements of administration had already proved ineffective in providing
adequate remedies, the McDaniel and Coutu courts utilized this analytical
tool to achieve a result that would best effectuate the Act's purposes in the
protection of covered workmen. The fact that the contracting agency had
arrived at a contrary conclusion concerning coverage is irrelevant to the
propriety of'judicial review. Absent a clear legislative mandate against such
review, the courts were obliged to hear the questions before them. In so

129. Brief for Appellee at 14-16. For cases that have held prevailing wage determinations of
the Secretary of Labor to be non-reviewable, see note 54 supra.
130. See 595 F.2d at 401. The court stated:
The cases cited by defendant for the proposition that the administrative remedies
are adequate involved contracts which did contain Davis-Bacon Act stipulations.
The dispute in those cases focused on the proper classification of work or the determination of wage rates. These and other cases involving the finality of the Secretary of Labor's decisions regarding wage rates and job classifications are not germane to the central question in this case, which is whether the required wage rate
stipulations are incorporated into the contract as a matter of law. That is not a
question on which deference to agency expertise is appropriate.
Id.
131. For an overview of the two methods for obtaining prevailing wage schedules-general
or area determinations and project determinations-see note 44 supra. In both cases, the Department of Labor depends largely on voluntary submission of wage rate data, such as statements showing wage rates on other projects in the locality, signed collective bargaining agreements, wage rates determined for public construction by state and local officials pursuant to
prevailing wage legislation, information furnished by federal and state agencies, and other pertinent information proffered by contractors and contractor's associations, labor organizations, and
other interested parties. See 29 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1979).
132. That jurisdiction is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (federal question) and 28
U.S.C. § 1337 (1976) (actions arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce). See
McDaniel v. University of Chicago, 512 F.2d at 587.
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ruling, the fact that an agency blatantly ignores the purpose of the controlling statute merits reversal of the administrative decision. There can be no
rational basis in law to support upholding that decision because it is more
important for a government agency to abide by the law than it is for a private individual. 133
CONCLUSION

An implied private cause of action now exists under the Davis-Bacon Act
for the benefit of laborers and mechanics who are not paid the prevailing
wage for work covered by the provisions of that Act. The existence of this
private right of action does not depend solely upon the presence of the requisite Davis-Bacon stipulations in the relevant government contract. There
may be other evidence that the contract is one for Davis-Bacon Act work, in
which case the required stipulations are incorporated into the contract by
operation of law.
Although McDaniel and Coutu have opened the courthouse door to the
aggrieved laborers, these laborers still have a substantial task ahead of them in
proving that the work actually performed was construction, alteration, and/or repair within the meaning of the Act. Yet, in merely providing a judicial forum
to these and future plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit has taken a significant step
by supplementing the existing administrative enforcement mechanisms and
establishing the judiciary as an independent check upon arbitrary administrative action.
Of course, the impact of the McDaniel and Coutu tandem depends upon
what the future portends for the Davis-Bacon Act itself. A number of government officials and labor authorities have recently advocated repeal of the
Act. 134 Nevertheless, many others have argued the continued need for the

133. See International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 627 v. Arthurs, 355 F. Supp. 7
(W.D. Okla. 1973), aff'd, 480 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1973). The court stated:
It is far more important for a government agency to follow the laws passed by
Congress and to show obedience to the judicial process than it would be in the case
of a private individual. In the first place, the agency is part of the legal system that
can survive only through obedience to the law. Furthermore, what an agency does
affects the lives of many people. If an agency is allowed to flout the law, the people
affected will soon lose confidence in that agency or perhaps, justifiably, in the total
legal system.
Id. at 13.
134. Essentially two arguments are asserted in support of repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act.
First, it is submitted that the Act has outlived its usefulness. Those adhering to this school of
thought characterize the Act as no more than a legislative attempt to arrest the depression
conditions of the 1930's, and suggest that "the union and the working man in general are now in
a much better position to bargain for and obtain wages in a community which are commensurate
with the cost of living.'" Improved Technology and Removal of Prevailing Wage Requirements in
Federally Assisted Housing: Hearing Before the Subcomn. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 168-69 (1972) (statement of Stanley Waranch, President, National Ass'n of Home Builders). Secondly, it is con-
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Act in light of the current high rate of unemployment, resulting in the
availability of excess manpower in many areas of the country. 135 The
Seventh Circuit decisions should, by providing a judicial forum in which the
rights guaranteed by the Davis-Bacon Act may be vindicated, serve to curtail
some of the criticism aimed at the often lackadaisical enforcement of the Act.
As a parallel to the increased judicial concern for the rights of laborers and
mechanics, the Department of Labor has expressed an intention to act aggressively to enforce wage determinations by monitoring contracting agency
enforcement activities and by directly enforcing an agency's contracts when
it fails or refuses to do so itself. 136
This 'combined judicial and executive effort should secure a long and
healthy future for the Davis-Bacon Act. These two branches of government,
however, have gone as far as possible in their firm commitment to the Act.
Legislative action in the form of amendment of the Act now is required to
clarify administrative procedures and to insure consistent and uniform enforcement. Some suggested modifications include the establishment of: (1)
mandatory protection devices, such as the required posting of payment
bonds before the commencement of work on federal construction projects;
(2) external checks on the administrative activities of the contracting agencies; and (3) an express grant of judicial review of enforcement actions and of
initial coverage determinations particularly. With these amendments, the
continued viability of the Act and its protection of local labor markets should
137
be realized.

tended that the Act contributes to inflation by requiring the expenditure of increased federal
funds on government assisted projects. See, e.g., id. at 3 (statement of Sen. John Tower). This
latter argument provoked the temporary suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act by President Nixon
in February of 1971, for purposes of curbing inflation generally and construction wage escalation particularly. See 29 C.F.R. § 5.1(a)(1) (1979).
135. See, e.g., The Administration of the Davis-Bacon Act: Hearings on H.R. 9656 and 9657
Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 658 (1962) (testimony of Leon B. Kromer, Jr., Executive V.P., Mechanical
Contractors Ass'n):
The basic purpose of the Act is no less valid today then it was 31 years ago when
first enacted. To eliminate this Act, would, on Federal and federally assisted construction, place laborers and mechanics in the jungle of fierce competition that is
the industry. Labor would again become a barter item in the bidding to get work.
In many areas of this country, with excess manpower available, the end result with
respect to wages and earnings would be all too apparent.
Accord, Elisburg, supra note 2, at 328. See also Davis-Bacon Act-Fringe Benefits: Hearings
Before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963).
136. See Elisburg, supra note 2, at 328.
137. United States v. Capelletti Bros., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. Fla. 1978), discussed at
notes 123-128 and accompanying text supra, was affirmed as this Case Commentary went to
press, 621 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1980).

